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Abstract
Several experimental studies have observed substantial violations of transitivity for decisions between risky lotteries
over monetary outcomes. The goal of our experiment is to test whether these violations also affect the evaluation
of health states. A particular feature of our experimental design is that it takes into account the possible role of
decision errors for generating violations of transitivity. Since we find neither substantial nor systematic deviations
from transitive choice behaviour, we can conclude that previously reported violations do not seem to bias health
utility measurement.
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1 Introduction
Health utility measurement plays an important role in
medical decision making, in particular in cost-effectiveness
analyses of alternative treatments. A central assumption in
health utility measurement is that preferences satisfy tran-
sitivity. Transitivity demands that whenever option A is
preferred to option B and B is preferred to C, then A has
to be preferred to C. In the absence of transitivity, a well-
defined utility function U (i.e. for all options A and B we
have U(A) ≥ U(B) if and only if A is weakly preferred to B)
does not exist. Consequently, standard methods in health
utility measurement, such as the time tradeoff method or
quality adjusted life years, cannot be meaningfully applied
in the absence of transitivity. Several empirical studies
observed substantial violations of transitivity, in particular
for choice between risky options (e.g. [1-8]). The validity
of health utility measurement would be seriously chal-
lenged if these violations carried over to the evaluation of
health states: No consistent rankings of health states could
be established and meaningful outcomes measures in
many applications of cost-effectiveness analysis would
simply become unavailable. However, since the evaluation
of health states involves consequences composed of sev-
eral attributes (i.e. at least health status and life duration),
behaviour may be fundamentally different than in the
above mentioned studies which are based on monetary
consequences.
To the best of our knowledge, it has not been analyzed
before whether transitivity empirically holds for the eva-
luation of health states. However, several studies observed
preference reversals in health utility measurement (e.g.
[9-11]) which are closely related to violations of transitiv-
ity. Preference reversals are an intensively discussed phe-
nomenon in decision making under risk. Here, a
preference reversal occurs if a risky option p is preferred
to another risky option q (i.e. p ≻ q) in a straight choice,
but a higher certainty equivalent (CE) is assigned to q (i.e.
CE(q) > CE(p)). Assume such a reversal and consider an
amount z with CE(q) > z > CE(p). Since the certainty
equivalent of an option should be indifferent to that
option, we get q ~ CE(q) ≻ z, z ≻ CE(p) ~ p, and p ≻ q
from choice. Hence, we have an intransitive cycle p ≻ q ≻
z ≻ p, i.e. an intransitive preference cycle. Precisely this
result has been utilized by many studies mentioned above-
in particular by [2,3,5,8]-in order to derive experimental
designs from the preference reversal literature where sub-
stantial violation rates of transitivity have been observed.
In one example from [3], 28 subjects exhibited the cycle
p ≻ q, z ≻ p, and q ≻ z, whereas only one subject exhibited
the opposite pattern-with lotteries given by the following
state-dependent payoff-triples: p = (7.5, 7.5, 1), q = (10, 3,
3) and z = (5, 5, 5), where the first state has a probability
of 0.4 and the second and third states a probability of 0.3
each. The motivation of our paper is that the existing
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evidence of preference reversals in health utility measure-
ment suggests violations of transitivity might also occur in
the evaluation of health states.
There is, however, some debate concerning the evidence
of violations of transitivity [12-19]. In particular, it has
been argued that the observed violations are not “true”
violations since they may be simply caused by random
errors. Consequently, we develop an experimental design
which allows us to discriminate between true violations
and violations caused by random error. Our design is pre-
sented in the next section where we also discuss the role
of errors as potential causes of transitivity violations. Sec-
tion 3 reports the results of our experiment and Section 4
offers some concluding observations.
2 Experimental Design and the Role of Errors
As most other studies on transitivity, our experiment was
conducted as a classroom experiment. We ran two stu-
dies with undergraduate economics students at the Uni-
versity of Kiel, a pretest with 40 subjects and a main test
with 98 subjects. The purpose of the pretest was merely
to adjust the attribute values of the alternatives for the
main test so that each has a similar chance to be chosen.
In both studies, subjects had to make six pairwise choices
which were composed of two series with three alterna-
tives each. Alternatives were described as in Figure 1,
which presents the choice between alternatives A and B
of series I.
Each alternative is characterized by three attributes: (i)
the probability of immediate death, (ii) the number of
additional life years in case of survival, and (iii) the num-
ber of days with migraine per weak. The corresponding
values of our design are presented in Table 1. In the
main test, we revised the attribute values of some alterna-
tives (i.e. B and C in Series I and C in Series II) used in
the pretest, as explained in more detail in Section 3. In
these cases, the attribute values of the pretest appear in
parentheses. In both tests, attribute values of the alterna-
tives were chosen such that the majority rule implies
intransitive cycles. The majority rule implies that an
alternative A is preferred to another alternative B, if the
number of attributes for which A is better than B exceeds
the number of attributes for which A is worse, i.e.
(1) A ≻ B ⇔ #{i: Ai ≻ Bi} > #{i: Bi ≻ Ai},
where Ai and Bi denote the attribute values of A and B.
It is easy to see that for the values in Table 1 we have for
Series I according to the majority rule B ≻ A (more years
and less migraine), C ≻ B (more years and lower probabil-
ity of death) and A ≻ C (lower probability of death and
less migraine). Also for Series II the majority rule implies
the cycle B ≻ A ≻ C ≻ B.
In the pretest, all subjects received an identical booklet
with all six choices, each choice on a separate sheet. In the
main test there were two booklets, one with three choices
(two from one series and one from the other series) at the
beginning of class and a second booklet with the remain-
ing three choices at the end of class. This procedure ruled
out that subjects could make consistency checks. The
main test also divided subjects into two groups, to control
for ordering effects. Compared to the first group, the
order of the two booklets and the order of alternatives in
the booklets were reversed in the second group. Since
there are no significant differences in the results for these
two groups we do not distinguish them in the following.
Finally, in order to motivate subjects for careful considera-
tion of the questions, 12 subjects drawn randomly received
a flat payment of 20 Euros in the main test.
In the studies of [2,3,5,8], intransitivities are tested by
the so-called cycling asymmetry. With three choices,
there exist two possible intransitive response cycles and
the studies conclude that observed intransitivities are
not simply noise if one cycle occurs with a significantly
Suppose you have a serious disease which leads to immediate death if 
uncured. Two alternative treatments are available: 
 
Under treatment A, you live for an additional 15 years and have serious 
migraine on one day per week. 
 
Under treatment B, you die immediately with a probability of 33%. With 
a probability of 67% you live for an additional 20 years and have no 
migraine. 
 
Which treatment do you choose? 
Figure 1 Presentation of alternatives.
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higher frequency than the other. The validity of this
argument has been questioned by [14]. Consider for
instance the result for Case 2 of [5] presented in Table
2. The entries in the first row give the possible choice
patterns with which a subject could respond to the
three questions and the second row gives the number of
subjects (out of a total of 90 subjects) who have actually
responded with a given pattern. For example ABA
means that a subject chose A over B in the first choice,
B over C in the second one, and A over C in the third
one. Altogether, there are eight different possible
response patterns out of which the last two (ABC and
BCA) are intransitive. Suppose that all subjects have
transitive preferences but they sometimes make errors
when choosing between lotteries. It is easy to see that
the cycle ABC can be caused by only one error if the
true preferences are ABA, BBC, or ACC. Analogously,
the cycle BCA is caused by one error if the true prefer-
ences are ACA, BBA, or BCC. According to Table 2, 18
subjects chose patterns ABA, BBC, or ACC while 69
subjects chose ACA, BBA, or BCC, i.e. the latter three
patterns occur much more frequently. As the simplest
case we can assume that the probability of errors is the
same for all subjects and independent of the underlying
true preference pattern. This implies that errors will
lead much more frequently to the cycle BCA than to
the cycle ABC given that the true preferences are always
transitive. The observed differences in those frequencies
thus may not be taken as evidence of intransitivities.
To control for the possible role of errors, [18,19] esti-
mate an explicit error model using data from an identically
repeated experiment. However, this procedure requires
additional assumptions on the structure of the error
model. Moreover, it is unclear whether the error model
does accommodate real behaviour sufficiently well, and if
not, it is hard to interpret the results. We therefore follow
a different route in this article: We simply adjust the attri-
butes of the alternatives such that the number of subjects
choosing patterns ABA, BBC, or ACC roughly equals the
number of subjects choosing the other three transitive
patterns ACA, BBA, or BCC. In this case random errors
would imply an approximately equal frequency of the two
intransitive patterns so that we can use the cycling asym-
metry to test for intransitivities. Given the categorical
nature of our observations, we shall use a one-tailed bino-
mial test to check if the null of equal frequency is rejected
in favour of a greater frequency of one intransitive pattern
in line with the cycling asymmetry.
3 Results
(i) the pretest
Table 3 presents the results of the pretest. Again, the first
row of the table gives the possible response patterns while
the second row gives for each pattern the number of sub-
jects who responded with this pattern. The table shows
that there are no intransitivities for Series II whereas 10%
of subjects responded with intransitive cycles for Series I;
yet both cycles occur with equal frequency and no cycling
asymmetry can be observed. However, the main goal of
the pretest was not to test transitivity but to help adjust
the alternatives for the main test as outlined in the preced-
ing section. The frequency of patterns which can lead to
the cycle ABC by one error (ABA, ACC, and BBC) is 16
for Series I and 9 for Series II. The frequency of the oppo-
site patterns (BCC, BBA, and ACA) is given by 20 for
Series I and 31 for Series II. These observations show that
in particular Series II was unbalanced in the pretest,
mainly due to the fact that alternative C is preferred too
frequently. We therefore made the attributes of this alter-
native less attractive in the main test. For Series I, we also
made alternative B slightly more attractive as indicated in
Table 1.
(ii) the main test
The results of the main test are presented in Table 4. We
can verify that our alternatives are rather balanced as the
frequency of patterns ABA, BBC, and ACC (52 for Series
I and 47 for Series II) is relatively close to the frequency
of patterns BCC, BBA, and ACA (40 for Series I and 43
for Series II). The incidence of intransitivities is rather
limited compared to previous studies which reported
substantial violations of transitivity. In our study only
6.1% of subjects violated transitivity in Series I and 8.1%
of subjects in Series II.
In both series, the cycle ABC occurs more frequently
than the cycle BCA. However, according to a one-tailed
binominal test (which was also used by [5] and is appro-
priate for observations falling into two categories, such
Table 2 Results of Starmer and Sugden (1998) [5]
ABA ACA BBA BBC ACC BCC ABC BCA
Case 2 5 2 12 9 4 45 3 (3.3%) 10 (11.1%)
Table 3 Results of the Pretest
ABA ACA BBA BBC ACC BCC ABC BCA
Series I 0 11 5 2 14 4 2 (5.0%) 2 (5.0%)
Series II 2 8 2 5 2 21 0 0
Table 1 Experimental Design of Series I (left panel) and






A 0 15 1 A 15 30 3
B 33 (35) 20 0 B 25 35 2
C 13 (10) 30 2 B 22 (20) 24
(25)
1
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as ours, where only a greater sample frequency of obser-
vations in one category than expected under the null
hypothesis justifies rejection), this difference is not sta-
tistically significant, so we can not conclude that a
cycling asymmetry exists. Since the rarely observed cycle
BCA is the one implied by the majority rule for our
design, this rule appears to perform rather poorly in our
experiment.
4 Conclusions
This paper has presented an experiment aimed at testing
transitivity in the valuation of health states, as required in
health utility assessments. A particular feature of our
design is the use of a balanced set of alternatives such
that an asymmetric frequency of the two intransitive
cycles is unlikely to result from random errors. In con-
trast to many previous experimental studies, we find
neither a substantial frequency of subjects violating tran-
sitivity nor a significant cycling asymmetry. Further
research may be required to understand whether the
absence of the intransitivity problem is mainly due to the
control for errors in our design or due to the fact that
our alternatives are not lotteries over monetary amounts,
as in previous studies, but composed of health states.
Moreover, additional studies of transitivity in the health
domain would be useful trying to overcome some of the
obvious limitations of our study which include a non-
representative sample of students and the small number
of stimuli. In particular, the fact that many of our sub-
jects had no experience with the presented health states
(i.e. days per week with migraine) may have contributed
to our results.
Altogether, we do not find evidence that people’s eva-
luation of discrete health states is substantially biased by
violations of transitivity. This finding is in line with other
recent experimental studies [18-20] that test transitivity
while controlling for the possible role of errors. If transi-
tivity holds, the evaluation of any one alternative does
not depend on the other alternative with which it is com-
pared. This is a necessary prerequisite for many tools and
concepts in the health domain like quality-adjusted life
years or cost-effectiveness analyses. It is therefore
encouraging that there really does not seem to be much
evidence for intransitive choice being a reality.
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Table 4 Results of the Main Test
ABA ACA BBA BBC ACC BCC ABC BCA
Series I 9 15 12 14 29 13 5 (5.1%) 1 (1.0%)
Series II 20 6 7 20 7 30 6 (6.1%) 2 (2.0%)
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